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FREE TO RETALIATE: A PLAINTIFF MUST
SHOW RETALIATION IS THE ONLY
MOTIVATION FOR AN EMPLOYER’S
RETALIATORY ACTION
Sansan Lin
I. INTRODUCTION
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,1 an
employment discrimination case, was overshadowed in the media by
other high-profile cases decided in the same three-day period.2 But
the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in Nassar will significantly
weaken workers’ rights and protections against discrimination in the
workplace.3 An employee will have much more difficulty in
obtaining redress for workplace discrimination and retaliation
because the employee must now prove that only the desire to retaliate
motivated the employer’s action.4 Even if the employer intended to

 J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; M.P.H. Health Policy, The
George Washington University, May 2010; B.S. Molecular Cell Developmental Biology,
University of California Los Angeles, May 2005. I would like to thank Professor Aimee Dudovitz
for teaching me how to write during my first year of law school, for her continued support and
guidance through school, and for her feedback on this Comment. Thank you to the editors and
staffers of Volume 47 of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their work on this Supreme
Court issue. And lastly, I would be remiss not to give a special thanks to the Editor-in-Chief of
Volume 48, Cameron Bell, for her thoughtful and careful feedback and efforts in pushing this
issue to publication, and the Executive Editor of Volume 48, Lauren Gerenraich.
1. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
2. The Supreme Court decided the other University of Texas case—an affirmative action
case—on the same day (June 24, 2013) in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013). In the next two days, the Supreme Court handed down decisions in the Voting Rights Act
and same-sex marriage cases in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) and United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). A search of media coverage on the Nassar case results
in a few articles in smaller, local publications as opposed to publications in The Wall Street
Journal, The New York Times, and other more well-known print and online media for the
aforementioned three cases.
3. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013).
4. See id. at 2525–26, 2534.
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retaliate, the employer can avoid liability entirely by providing any
other justification for taking a challenged employment action.5
Prohibition of employment discrimination on the basis of an
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and
prohibition of employer retaliation against an individual who has
opposed or filed a claim of employment discrimination share a
“symbiotic relationship.”6 But, the Supreme Court in Nassar has
“drive[n] a wedge” between status-based discrimination and
employer retaliation claims by ruling that they are distinct claims and
that to prevail on a Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must meet
the high but-for causation standard.7 Nassar establishes two separate
causation standards for two claims that have been regarded as “twin
safeguards in . . . ‘mixed-motive’ [employment discrimination]
cases.”8
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Nassar
is at odds with Congress’s intent behind its 1991 amendments to
Title VII, and the Supreme Court’s prior understanding of the
relationship between Title VII’s discrimination and retaliation
prohibitions. Part II lists the provisions at issue in Nassar and
provides an overview of the interchange between the Supreme Court
and Congress in interpreting the appropriate causation standard for
Title VII claims. Part III sets forth the facts and procedural posture of
the case. Part IV discusses the Court’s holding and its reasoning. Part
V argues that the Court’s reasoning in Nassar is flawed because it
contradicts Congress’s intent and diverges from Supreme Court
precedent. Part VI concludes with the practical implications of the
Nassar holding and challenges Congress to again restore Title VII’s
protections against discrimination in the workplace.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the “1964 Act”)
prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.9 Title VII also
5. See id.
6. See id. at 2537 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 2535.
8. Id.
9. In 1964, Congress passed employment protections in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)).
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prohibits retaliation by an employer against an employee who has
opposed or filed a charge of employment discrimination.10
Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits “status-based discrimination”—
discrimination against an individual based on five listed
characteristics.11 It provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.12
Section 2000e-3(a) prohibits employer retaliation providing:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or
applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.13
A quarter century after the passage of the 1964 Act, the Supreme
Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins14 explained the causation
standard necessary to establish a status-based discrimination claim
under § 2000e-2(a).15 Though there was no majority opinion, six
justices agreed on the viability of a mixed-motive theory16 “that a
plaintiff could prevail on a claim of status-based discrimination if he
or she could show that one of the prohibited traits was a ‘motivating’
or ‘substantial’ factor in the employer’s decision.”17 Under the Price
Waterhouse framework, if a plaintiff successfully established that
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).
11. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522. The Court separates wrongful employer conduct under
§ 2000e into two categories. The first is status-based discrimination, and the second is employer
retaliation. Id.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
14. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
15. Id. at 258 (defining “because of” in § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
16. See id. at 240–42.
17. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2526 (citing Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring); id. at 276 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
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race, color, religion, sex, or national origin motivated the employer,
then the burden shifted to the employer to prove that it would have
taken the same actions, even without a discrimination-based
motivation. If the employer could successfully demonstrate this, the
employer would avoid liability.18
Two years after Price Waterhouse, Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (the “1991 Act”).19 The 1991 Act added a new
provision to Title VII codifying the mixed-motive theory, otherwise
known as the motivating-factor causation standard of the Price
Waterhouse framework.20 The new provision, § 2000e-2(m), states:
“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.”21 Thus,
Congress agreed with the Price Waterhouse holding that a plaintiff
alleging a § 2000e-2(a) violation need not meet the but-for standard,
which would require the employee to show that status-based
discrimination was the only reason for the employer’s challenged
practice. Rather, a plaintiff need only meet the less stringent
motivating-factor causation standard, by showing that status-based
discrimination motivated the employer’s practice.
However, Congress did not agree with the Price Waterhouse
burden-shifting framework, because the 1991 Act abrogated it with
§ 2000e-5(g)(2).22 Under § 2000e-5(g)(2), if an employer can prove
that it would have taken the same employment action regardless of
the five traits, it can avoid monetary damages and a reinstatement
order,23 but not complete liability like it could under Price
Waterhouse.
This was the state of the law when the Supreme Court jumped
back into the fray with the Nassar decision.

18. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526.
19. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
21. Id.
22. See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2); Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526 (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc.,
557 U.S. 167, 178 n.5 (2009)).
23. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526 (citing Gross, 557 U.S. at 178 n.5).
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (the
“University”) trains medical, graduate, and health profession
students, residents, and postdoctoral fellows.24 The University has
affiliation agreements with healthcare facilities, including Parkland
Memorial Hospital (the “Hospital”), to give its students the
opportunity to obtain clinical experience.25 The Hospital’s affiliation
agreement with the University requires it to offer physician positions
to the University’s faculty members.26
Dr. Naiel Nassar “is a medical doctor of Middle Eastern descent
who specializes in internal medicine and infectious diseases.”27 From
1995 to 1998 and from 2001 to 2006, he was a member of both the
University’s faculty and the Hospital’s staff of physicians.28 Dr.
Phillip Keiser was Nassar’s principal supervisor until 2004, when the
Hospital hired Dr. Beth Levine as the University’s Chair of
Infectious Disease Medicine.29 Keiser continued to directly supervise
Nassar, but Levine became his ultimate superior.30
Nassar believed Levine was biased against him because of his
Middle Eastern heritage.31 Levine singled out Nassar; she questioned
his productivity and work ethic and scrutinized his billing practices
despite Keiser’s assurances that Nassar worked very hard.32 In 2005,
Levine opposed hiring another Middle Eastern physician and
commented in Keiser’s presence that “Middle Easterners are lazy.”33
After the Hospital hired the other doctor, “Levine [commented],
again in Keiser’s presence, that the Hospital had ‘hired another
one.’”34
24. About UT Southwestern Facts and Figures, UT SW. MED. CTR., http://
www.utsouthwestern.edu/about-us/facts.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
25. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2523–24. In 1998, Nassar left both positions to pursue additional medical
education, but returned to his positions in 2001. Id. at 2523.
29. Id. at 2523; id. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 2523 (majority opinion).
31. See id.
32. Id. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 2523 (majority opinion).
33. Id. at 2536 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
34. Id.
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Nassar met with Dr. Gregory Fitz, the University’s Chair of
Internal Medicine, numerous times regarding Levine’s behavior and
perceived harassment.35 Levine’s hostility and bias against him led
Nassar to arrange with the Hospital to continue working at its clinic
without also continuing as faculty at the University, in an effort to
remove himself from Levine’s supervision.36 After negotiations, the
Hospital verbally offered Nassar a staff position.37
Shortly after reaching this agreement, Nassar wrote a letter to
Fitz and sent copies to others, resigning from his teaching position at
the University.38 In this letter, Nassar stated that the main reason for
his resignation was Levine’s continued harassment stemming from
bias against Arabs and Muslims.39 Fitz, shocked by the letter, told
Keiser that Levine had been publicly humiliated and needed to be
publicly exonerated.40 Fitz opposed the Hospital’s staff position offer
to Nassar, arguing that this arrangement contradicted the Hospital
and University’s affiliation agreement requiring that staff members
also be University faculty.41 The Hospital withdrew its offer to
employ Nassar.42
B. Procedural Posture
Nassar first filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which found “credible
testimonial evidence that the University had retaliated against Nassar
for his allegations of discrimination by Levine.”43 Nassar then filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, alleging two Title VII violations. Nassar alleged that the
University’s discrimination against him on the basis of his race,
religion, and national origin resulted in his constructive discharge—a
status-based discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a).44 Second,
35. Id. at 2523 (majority opinion).
36. See id.
37. Id. at 2536 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 2523–24 (majority opinion).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2536 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
44. Id. at 2524 (majority opinion).
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Nassar alleged that the University retaliated against him for
complaining about Levine’s conduct by preventing the Hospital from
hiring him—a retaliation claim under § 2000e-3(a).45
At trial, the district court instructed the jury on the retaliation
claim that Nassar needed only to prove that the University acted at
least in part to retaliate.46 The jury found for Nassar on both Title VII
claims and awarded him $438,167.66 in backpay and over $3 million
in compensatory damages.47
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in
part and vacated in part.48 The Fifth Circuit vacated the jury’s verdict
on constructive discharge, concluding that Nassar had not provided
sufficient evidence to support his claim that Levine’s discrimination
resulted in his discharge.49 However, it affirmed the jury’s finding on
the retaliation claim “on the theory that retaliation claims . . . like
claims of status-based discrimination . . . require only a showing that
retaliation was a motivating factor for the adverse employment
action, rather than its but-for cause.”50 The Fifth Circuit found that
the evidence supported the jury’s finding that Fitz’s opposition to
Nassar’s employment was motivated in part by the desire to retaliate
against Nassar for his complaints regarding Levine.51
The Fifth Circuit denied the University’s petition for a rehearing
and rehearing en banc.52 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.53 The
issue before the Court was whether the mixed-motive causation
standard applicable to § 2000e-2(a) claims was also applicable to
§ 2000e-3(a) retaliation claims.54
IV. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS
Considering the question of which causation standard is
appropriate for a § 2000-e3(a) retaliation claim, Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, concluded that “[t]he text, structure, and
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 2536 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 456 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 450.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524 (majority opinion).
Id.
Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 688 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2012).
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517.
Id. at 2522–23.
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history of Title VII demonstrate that a plaintiff making a retaliation
claim under § 2000-e3(a) must establish that his or her protected
activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the
employer.”55 The Court’s opinion emphasized what it saw as a clear
distinction between a discrimination claim and a retaliation claim
under Title VII, labeling the first “status-based discrimination” and
the second “employer retaliation.”56
The Court began its analysis with a discussion of its holding in
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,57 which interpreted “because
of” in a provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA) as requiring a showing of but-for causation.58 The
Court used the reasoning of Gross to conclude that § 2000e-3(a)
requires proof “that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the
challenged employment action.”59 The Court rejected the
interpretation that § 2000e-3(a) requires only the motivating-factor
causation standard, noting three major flaws in that interpretation60
The Court also noted the implications of lessening the causation
standard for retaliation claims.61
A. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. Is Persuasive
In reaching its conclusion that § 2000e-3(a) requires a plaintiff
to meet the but-for causation standard, the Court began by discussing
its conclusion and reasoning in Gross with respect to the issue of
causation in the context of the ADEA.62 The Court found that
although Gross discussed a different statute and limited its judgment
to the ADEA, Gross is not without “persuasive force” and
“possess[es] significant parallels.”63

55. Id. at 2534.
56. Id. at 2522. Justice Kennedy began, “This opinion discusses the causation rules for two
categories of wrongful employer conduct prohibited by Title VII. The first type is called, for
purposes of this opinion, status-based discrimination. . . . The second type of conduct is employer
retaliation . . . .” Id.
57. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
58. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2527.
59. Id. at 2528.
60. See infra Part III.A.
61. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531–32
62. Id. at 2527.
63. Id. at 2527–28.
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The Court in Gross considered whether the ADEA’s text
“authorizes a mixed-motives age discrimination claim.”64
Section 623(a) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s age.”65
The Court concluded that § 623(a) did not authorize mixedmotive claims.66 It reached this conclusion by looking at the ordinary
meaning of the text, noting that “[s]tatutory construction must begin
with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the
ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose.”67 To determine the ordinary meaning of
“because of,” the Court looked to English dictionaries defining
“because of” to mean “by reason of” or “on account of.”68 Given this
understanding of the phrase, the ADEA provision in question meant
that a plaintiff needed to prove that age was the “but-for” cause of
the employer’s adverse decision.69
In Gross, the Court declined to adopt the Price Waterhouse
interpretation of causation, concluding that textual differences
between Title VII and the ADEA prevented the application of Price
Waterhouse to the ADEA.70 The Court in Gross noted that though
Congress made a number of changes to the ADEA in the 1991 Act, it
did not add a clarification provision like it did to Title VII’s new
provision § 2000e-2(m).71 Additionally, the Gross Court held that “it
would not be proper to read Price Waterhouse as announcing a rule
that applied to both statutes, despite their similar wording and
contemporaneous enactment” because Congress’s 1991 amendments
to Title VII—the new provision setting forth the motivating factor
standard72 and the abrogation of the Price Waterhouse
64. Gross, 557 U.S. at 175.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
66. Gross, 557 U.S. at 175.
67. Id. (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252
(2004)).
68. Id. at 176.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 178 n.5.
71. Id. at 174–75.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
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burden-shifting framework—suggested that the motivating-factor
standard did not flow “organically” from the text.73 In other words,
Congress would not have made these amendments if the text of Title
VII could be read as setting such a standard. Since the meaning did
not flow organically from the text, the Gross Court concluded that
the standard could not be read into the ADEA because the ADEA did
not contain a provision similar to § 2000e-2(m).
The Court in Nassar concluded that because “Title VII’s
anti-retaliation provision, which is set forth in § 2000e-3(a), appears
in a section separate from Title ban on status-based discrimination,”
and because the anti-relation provision is textually similar to the
ADEA provision considered in Gross, the “proper conclusion . . . is
that Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to
retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment
action.”74
B. The Court’s Assessment of Flaws in Nassar
and the United States’ Argument
Nassar and the United States’ main argument was that
(1) retaliation is defined by the statute to be an unlawful
employment practice; (2) § 2000e-2(m) allows unlawful
employment practices to be proved based on a showing that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for—but not necessarily the but-for factor
in—the challenged employment action; and (3) the Court
has . . . held that retaliation for complaining about race
discrimination is discrimination based on race.75
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and noted three
major problems with the interpretation that the motivating-factor
standard applies to retaliation claims: (1) such a reading is
inconsistent with the provision’s plain language;76 (2) such a reading
is inconsistent with the design and structure of Title VII;77 and (3)
the
Court’s
preceding
decisions
interpreting
federal
73. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2527 (2013) (citing Gross, 557
U.S. at 178 n.5).
74. Id. at 2528.
75. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2529.
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antidiscrimination laws as treating “status-based discrimination as
also prohibiting retaliation”78 do not apply to statutes as “precise,
complex, and exhaustive as Title VII.”79
1. Plain Language of § 2000e-2(m) and Section 107 of the 1991 Act
The Court concluded that interpreting § 2000e-3(a) as requiring
the motivating-factor standard is inconsistent with the plain language
§ 2000e-2(m).80 According to the Court, the plain language of
§ 2000e-2(m) and section 107 of the 1991 Act, which created it,
indicate Congress’s intention that the motivating-factor causation
standard not extend to all unlawful employment practices defined by
Title VII.81
The Court stated that § 2000e-2(m) only addresses status-based
discrimination because the provision begins by referring to “unlawful
employment practices,” but then only specifies actions based on the
employee’s status—race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.82
Because the provision only refers to the unlawful employment
practice of discriminating on the basis of the five characteristics but
not to retaliation claims, the Court concluded that “given this clear
language,” Congress intended to limit the provision’s coverage to
only discrimination under § 2000e-2(a) and not retaliation claims
under § 2000e-3(a).83 “[I]t would be improper to conclude that what
Congress omitted from the statute is nevertheless within its scope.”84
The Court also noted, the fact that a different portion of the 1991
Act “contains an express reference to all unlawful employment
actions, reinforces the conclusion that Congress acted deliberately
when it omitted retaliation claims from § 2000e-2(m).”85 For
example, section 109 of the 1991 Act exempts employers in foreign
countries from complying with §§ 2000e-2 and 2000e-3 if doing so
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2530.
80. Id. at 2528.
81. Id.
82. Id. “An unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(m) (2006).
83. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2529.
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would cause the employer to violate the laws of the country where
the workplace is located.86 Section 109 references both
discrimination and retaliation sections by explicitly listing “section
703 or 704,” which correspond to the sections prohibiting statusbased discrimination and retaliatory employer actions in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.87
The Court noted that section 109 indicates that Congress
understood what language was necessary to reference all unlawful
employment practices under Title VII, so if Congress had intended to
“make the motivating-factor standard applicable to all Title VII
claims,” then it would have used the same language in section 107 of
the 1991 Act.88 However, section 107 only provides that it will
amend section 703 (codified in § 2000e-2) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, but makes no reference to section 704 (codified in § 2000e3).89
2. Structure and Design of Title VII
The Court found that applying the motivating-factor standard to
Title VII retaliation claims would also be inconsistent “with the
design and structure of the statute as a whole.”90 First, the Court
found the placement of § 2000e-2(m) significant and indicative of
Congress’s intentions.91 Second, the Court found the complexity of
Title VII distinguished it from other broad discrimination statutes,
and thus the Court’s holding in Nassar did not contradict prior
Supreme Court interpretations of retaliation claims.92
a. Placement of § 2000e-2(m)
The Court found it significant that Congress inserted the
motivating-factor provision in § 2000e-2, the same subsection that
prohibits status-based discrimination.93 To the Court, this particular
placement of the new provision, codifying the motivating-factor

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 12111 (2006).
Id.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2529.
Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-5(g) (2006).
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2529.
Id.
Id. at 2529–30.
Id.
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causation standard as applied to status-based discrimination claims,
indicates Congress’s intention to only apply this standard to
§ 2000e-2 discrimination claims.
b. Default interpretations of antidiscrimination laws
do not apply to Title VII
The Court did not reject Nassar and the United States’ argument
that
previous
Supreme
Court
decisions
interpreting
antidiscrimination laws have generally treated prohibitions of statusbased discrimination as also prohibiting retaliation.94 But the Court
rejected the argument that these prior cases support the interpretation
that the motivating-factor standard applies to retaliation claims. It
concluded that because Title VII “is a detailed statutory scheme,”
those cases did not control the issue in Nassar.95
The Court acknowledged that its cases have interpreted
Congress’s enactment of broadly phrased antidiscrimination statutes
as demonstrating Congress’s intent to prohibit retaliation against
those who oppose or report the type of discrimination at issue.96
However, the Court concluded these cases did not control its
decision because Title VII is a very “precise, complex, and
exhaustive” statute.97 Applying “the default rules that apply only
when Congress writes a broad and undifferentiated statute” would
improperly adopt an incorrect interpretation.98
Additionally, to further support its argument that it would be
improper to apply the Court’s default interpretation of
antidiscrimination statutes, the Court noted Congress’s enactment of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which included
an express anti-retaliation provision.99 Congress enacted the ADA a
year before crafting 1991 Act amendments to Title VII.100 Therefore,
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2530.
96. Id. at 2530. E.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 452, 452–53 (2008)
(holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which states that all persons shall have equal rights under the law,
not only prohibits racial discrimination but also retaliation against those who oppose it); GómezPérez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008) (finding a bar on retaliation in the federal-employee
provisions of the ADEA).
97. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2530.
98. Id. at 2530–31.
99. Id. at 2531.
100. Id.

FREE TO RETALIATE

494

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

9/25/2014 4:47 PM

[Vol. 47:481

because Congress knew how to craft express anti-retaliation
provisions, not including such language in the 1991 Act’s Title VII
amendments indicated Congress’s intent to exclude relation claims
from the motivating-factor causation standard.101
C. Repercussions of Lessening the Causation Standard
The Court warned of a number of practical consequences that
would result from applying the motivating-factor standard to
§ 2000e-3(a) retaliation claims.
First, the Court noted that the number of retaliation claims filed
with the EEOC doubled from around 16,000 to over 31,000 over a
fifteen-year period.102 Concerned with the number of retaliation
claims, the Court stressed that “proper interpretation . . . of § 2000e3(a) and its causation standard have central importance to the fair
and responsible allocation of resources in the judicial and litigation
systems.”103
Additionally, the Court cautioned that applying the motivatingfactor causation standard could contribute to the filing of frivolous
claims.104 For example, an employee who knows his or her employer
is about to cause a change in employment status (for instance, firing
for poor work performance, transferring assignments or locations)
could make an unfounded claim of discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.105 Once the employment
change occurs, the employee could file a retaliation claim.106 In the
eyes of the Court, applying the motivating-factor causation standard
would make it more difficult to dismiss frivolous claims.107
V. DISCUSSION
The Court’s discussion of the number of discrimination and, in
particular, retaliation claims filed with the EEOC, and its concern
with frivolous claims, may reveal the Court’s true motivation behind
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited
June 20, 2013)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2531–32.
105. Id. at 2532.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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its employer-friendly Nassar holding. Though the Court used textual
and structural arguments to support its interpretation of congressional
intent, its holding contradicts Congress’s stated purposes of Title VII
and subsequent amendments enacted via the 1991 Act. The Court’s
holding also diverges from a line of preceding Supreme Court cases.
Lastly, the Court’s reasoning about the text and structure of Title VII
is flawed because these same textual and structural arguments could
also be interpreted to support a different conclusion—namely, that
the mixed-motive standard does apply to retaliation claims.
A. The Nassar Holding Contradicts Congressional Intent
The Court looked to the 1991 Act’s text and, in the Court’s
words, “the structure” of Title VII to conclude that Congress
intended to distinguish retaliation claims from status-based
discrimination claims and to require a higher standard for these
claims.
Congress passed the 1991 Act in part to respond to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse.108 Specifically, the purpose of
the 1991 Act was to “restor[e] the civil rights protections that were
dramatically limited by recent Supreme Court decisions”109 and to
“strengthen existing protections and remedies available under federal
civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate
compensation for victims of discrimination.”110
The 1991 Act restored and strengthened Title VII protections
and remedies by eliminating the Price Waterhouse burden shifting,
which allowed an employer to avoid liability entirely, and by
creating § 2000(m), which codified the motivating-factor causation
standard.111 Congress did not disagree with the Court’s adoption of a
causation standard that was less stringent than the but-for standard,
but Congress thought allowing an employer the ability to escape

108. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), at 45 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 583
[hereinafter House Report Part I].
109. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(II), at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694 [hereinafter
House Report Part II].
110. Id.
111. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g) (2006).
112. See id.
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liability under the Price Waterhouse framework limited Title VII
protections.112
The Court’s holding in Nassar contradicts Congress’s stated
goals in passing the 1991 Act because it once again weakens Title
VII protections, particularly against employer retaliation. The
Court’s interpretation is that, despite Congress’s stated intentions to
strengthen and restore, Congress really intended to require plaintiffs
to meet a stringent but-for causation standard allowing an employer
the ability to avoid liability on retaliation claims. Under the Court’s
interpretation, an employer can retaliate against an employee for
making a discrimination claim and face no liability if it can provide
any other additional reason for taking the retaliatory action.113
But, Congress found Price Waterhouse “inadequately
protective” because its burden-shifting framework allowed an
employer to avoid liability.114 Thus, given the legislative history of
the 1991 Act, the Court’s interpretation makes little sense.
B. Supreme Court Precedent
The Court’s distinction between status-based discrimination and
retaliation claims diverges from a line of Supreme Court cases that
have recognized the “close connection between discrimination and
retaliation for complaining about discrimination.”115 Although the
Court in Nassar did not disagree with precedent regarding
discrimination and retaliation, it concluded that those prior decisions
were not controlling because Title VII is unlike the statutes
considered in those preceding cases.116 But, in reality Title VII is not
so different from those other antidiscrimination statutes.
In a line of decisions prior to Nassar, the Supreme Court held
that a ban on discrimination encompasses retaliation because the
enforcement of antidiscrimination depends on those who are willing
to speak against, bear witness to, or file complaints of

112. See id.
113. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2544 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court’s but-for causation standard does not mean that the plaintiff has failed to
prove she was subjected to unlawful retaliation. It does mean, however, that proof of a retaliatory
motive alone yields no victory for the plaintiff.”).
114. See id. at 2538.
115. See id. at 2537.
116. Id. at 2530 (majority opinion).
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discrimination.117 The Court has long understood prohibitions against
discrimination as also prohibiting retaliation for complaining of or
speaking against discrimination.118 In fact, the Court has held that
“retaliation in response to a complaint about [proscribed]
discrimination is ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of [the characteristic
Congress sought to immunize against adverse employment
action] . . . .’”119
In Nassar, the Court attempted to distinguish Title VII from
other antidiscrimination statutes by noting that it is a “detailed
statutory scheme” because it “enumerates specific unlawful
employment practices,”120 “defines key terms,”121 “exempts certain
types of employers,”122 and “creates an administrative agency.”123
However, the ADEA also contains provisions that proscribe
retaliation, as well as provisions that set out specific prohibited
employer practices.124 Indeed, some provisions of the ADEA are
broad while others are specific and detailed, and yet the Court still
interpreted the federal-sector provision of the ADEA prohibiting
discrimination based on age125 to also bar retaliation.126 Like the
117. Id. at 2337 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Burlington N. & S.F.R. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 63 (2006)).
118. The Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which provides that all citizens of the United
States have the same property rights, protected “a white man who suffered retaliation after
complaining of discrimination against his black tenant.” Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229 (1969). In the context of sex discrimination, the Court has held that “[r]etaliation against
a person because [he] has complained of sex discrimination . . . is another form of intentional sex
discrimination.” Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2537 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005)) (internal citations omitted). The Court held
that “the federal-sector provision of the [ADEA . . .] barring discrimination ‘based on age,’ also
proscribes retaliation.” Id. at 2538 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553
U.S. 474, 479–91 (2008). The Court has also held that retaliation for race discrimination
constitutes discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which provides that all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States should have equal rights. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553
U.S. 442, 447–57 (2008).
119. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179 n.3 (emphasis added).
120. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2530. The Court cited § 2000e-2(a)(1), (b), (c)(1), (d) (which
prohibits “status-based discrimination by employers, employment agencies, labor organizations,
and training programs respectively”), § 2000e-3(a) (which prohibits “retaliation for opposing, or
making or supporting a complaint about, unlawful employment actions”), and § 2000e-3(b)
(which prohibits “advertising a preference for applicants of a particular race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin”). Id.
121. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)).
122. Id. (citing § 2000e-1).
123. Id. (citing §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-12).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), (d) (2006).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 633(a) (2006).
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ADEA, Title VII is detailed in some provisions, but it also contains
broad and general provisions.127
Not only is Title VII not distinguishable from other
antidiscrimination statutes simply because it contains some
specifications, but the Court’s reasoning leads to the conclusion that
“when Congress homed in on retaliation and codified the
proscription, as it did in Title VII, Congress meant to have less force
than the protection available when the statute does not mention
retaliation.”128 This conclusion suggests that when Congress takes
more time to write a specific statute, it means that Congress intended
these statutes to offer less protection then broadly written statutes.129
Additionally, this conclusion makes even less sense given that
Congress intended to strengthen Title VII protections.
C. Flaws in the Court’s Textual and Structural Arguments
The Court supported its reasoning and holding with textual and
structural arguments, but these arguments are flawed in a number of
ways. In fact, the very same text and structural aspects of Title VII
that the Court cites to support its argument also support the
conclusion that the mixed-motive standard, not the but-for standard,
applies to retaliation claims.
1. The Court Used Gross’s Limited Holding to Interpret Title VII
The Court looked to its Gross holding to interpret the meaning
of “because” in § 2000e-3(a), but by finding that Gross is persuasive,
the Court ignored that Gross limited its interpretation to only the
ADEA.130 Even more importantly, the Court also ignored that Gross
distinguished the ADEA and Title VII.
In Gross, the Court interpreted “because of”131 to mean a
requirement of the but-for standard.132 The Court in Gross

126. Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479–91 (2008).
127. Section 2000e-2(a) bans all discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Although the provision lists characteristics, the ban is a general ban on any discrimination
based on these factors.
128. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2541 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
129. See id.
130. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–78 (2009).
131. “It shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
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acknowledged that, in Price Waterhouse, it interpreted “because of”
in § 2000e-2(a) as requiring only the motivating-factor standard.133
To reach its conclusion that “because of” in the ADEA required the
but-for standard, the Court in Gross distinguished the ADEA from
Title VII.134 It noted that the interpretation of a Title VII provision
and its causation standard could not be read into a different statute,
such as the ADEA.135 The Gross Court specifically cautioned that
“when conducting statutory interpretation, we must be careful not to
apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without
careful and critical examination.”136 Therefore, the Court looked only
to the text of § 623(a) in the ADEA.137
Despite this limitation and the distinction between the ADEA
and Title VII in Gross, the Nassar Court found Gross persuasive in
interpreting a Title VII provision.138 In 2009, the Court read “because
of” in § 623(a) of the ADEA to require the but-for causation standard
by distinguishing it from “because of” in § 2000e-2(a) of Title VII.
In 2013, the Court found that “because” in § 2000e-3(a) requires a
plaintiff to meet the but-for causation standard, because there is no
“meaningful textual difference” between the use of “because” in the
two statutes and because the two statutes are, in fact, similar.139
Essentially, according to the Court’s reasoning, “because” in the
ADEA requires the but-for standard because it is different from Title
VII, and “because” in § 2000e-3(a) of Title VII requires the but-for
standard because it is no different from the text of the ADEA.
2. The Court Read Different Meanings into
the Same Word in the Same Statute
The Court’s textual argument is flawed because the Court’s
interpretation contradicts a general principle of statutory
interpretation—that “identical phrases appearing in the same
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 623 (2006).
132. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176.
133. Id. at 171.
134. Id. at 174–75.
135. Id. at 174.
136. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id. at 175–76.
138. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2527–28 (2013).
139. Id. at 2528.
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statute . . . ordinarily bear a consistent meaning.”140 The Court read
the same word, “because,” in different provisions of the same statute
to have different meanings. “Because of” in § 2000e-2(a) is read to
require a plaintiff to meet the mixed-motive standard, while
“because” in § 2000e-3(a) is read to require a plaintiff to meet the
but-for standard. Thus, the Court has read two different meanings
into two textually similar words appearing in the same statute in
contradiction of a general rule of statutory interpretation.
3. The New Provision’s Placement in the 1991 Act
The Court reasoned that Congress intended the mixed-motive
causation standard to only apply to status-based discrimination
claims because Congress placed the new provision in § 2000e-2.
However, this reasoning is flawed because the Court’s conclusion is
based on the idea that § 2000e-2 only contains provisions concerning
the prohibition against status-based discrimination.
Section 2000e-2 “does not deal exclusively with discrimination
based on protected characteristics.”141 Rather, it contains provisions
that expand beyond application to just status-based discrimination.
Section 2000e-2 contains fourteen sub-provisions covering other
issues, such as training programs,142 national security,143 and
members of the Communist Party.144 In particular, § 2000e-2(g)
states that “it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to refuse to hire” or “to discharge any individual from
any position . . . if” the position “is subject to any requirement
imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States”
and “the individual fails to fulfill that requirement.”145
Section 2000e-2(g) not only identifies status-based discrimination; it
refers to unlawful employment practices in general.146

140. Id. at 2545 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs.,
Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007)).
141. Id. at 2543.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (2006).
143. Id. § 2000e-2(g).
144. Id. § 2000e-2(f).
145. Id. § 2000e-2(g)(1)–(2).
146. Id. § 2000e-2(g).
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Because the Court disregards provisions like § 2000e-2(g) that
apply to both status-based discrimination and retaliation claims, the
Court’s reasoning that the placement of § 2000e-2(m) supports its
holding is flawed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar will make it much
more difficult for employees to bring and succeed on Title VII
retaliation claims. “[T]he ban on discrimination and the ban on
retaliation against a discrimination complainant have traveled
together.”147 But now, these two claims must meet very different
standards. The Nassar holding will have a number of practical
implications on Title VII lawsuits.
A. Difficulty in Seeking Protection Under Title VII
Plaintiffs bringing a Title VII retaliation claim will have a harder
time prevailing because they must now meet the but-for standard.
But, the true implication of the Nassar decision extends beyond the
difficulties of prevailing in a retaliation claim. Like the plaintiff in
Nassar, plaintiffs may simply lose the protections of Title VII.
Nassar brought two Title VII claims: (1) a claim that the
University discriminated against him on the basis of his race,
religion, and national origin, which resulted in his constructive
discharge, and (2) a claim that the University retaliated against him
after he made a discrimination claim, by preventing his employment
at the Hospital.148 The jury found for him on both claims.149 The
Fifth Circuit vacated the jury’s verdict on the constructive discharge
claim because Nassar did not present sufficient evidence that
discrimination led to his discharge.150 This left Nassar only a
retaliation claim. In Nassar, the Supreme Court remanded the case to
the Fifth Circuit for proceedings consistent with its holding.151 On
remand, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment in its
entirety and remanded for proceedings consistent with the Supreme
147. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2535 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
148. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525 (majority opinion).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2534.
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Court’s Nassar holding.152 Because the University can argue that Fitz
prevented Nassar’s employment at the Hospital because of the
hospital affiliation agreement, Nassar will likely lose in his case
against the University.
Nassar’s experience illustrates a situation where an employee
has, in fact, experienced discrimination on the basis of race and
religion, but is left without relief under Title VII as a result of Gross.
Keiser testified to Levine’s statements regarding Nassar and Middle
Easterners.153 If an employee takes steps to extricate himself from a
discriminatory situation, as Nassar did, that employee cannot
attribute loss of employment to an employer’s discriminatory
behavior. Nassar notified Fitz and others about Levine’s behavior in
a letter and terminated his faculty position. If an employer acts
against the employee for complaining about and removing himself
from a discriminatory environment, that employee, like Nassar, will
only have a retaliation claim under Title VII. The Nassar holding
will leave employees like Nassar with no remedy, for an employer
acting against an employee is not liable so long as the employer can
provide any justification (besides the desire to retaliate) for taking a
retaliatory action. Under § 2000e-3(a), post-Nassar, an employer,
even if it has discriminated on the basis of status and retaliated
against an employee, can escape liability by providing evidence of
any other motivation for a retaliatory action. Requiring plaintiffs to
prove that retaliation is the but-for (i.e., only) reason for an
employment action leaves employees unprotected under Title VII.
B. Possible Jury Confusion
The Court states that there is a clear textual and conceptual
distinction between discrimination and retaliation claims,154 but in
reality the two claims are not so clearly separated. Like in Nassar, an
employee’s claims could stem from the same series of actions and
experiences that ultimately culminate in an employer’s retaliatory
action. In such a situation, it may be difficult for a jury to clearly

152. Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., No. 11-10338, 2013 WL 3943554, at *1 (5th Cir.
Aug. 1, 2013).
153. See supra note 33, Part III.A.
154. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532.
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differentiate between the two claims and apply separate causation
standards.155
In Nassar, both of the plaintiff’s claims ultimately derived from
his experiences with Levine’s behavior.156 Nassar’s discrimination
claim was based on Levine’s racial and religious bias, and Nassar’s
retaliation claim was based on the idea that Fitz blocked his
employment at the Hospital in part to publicly exonerate Levine from
Nassar’s complaints of discrimination.157
The Court may have anticipated concern about jury confusion,
evidenced by its attempt to differentiate Nassar’s two claims.158 The
Court presented the status-based discrimination and retaliation
claims as two separate legal claims, and it also attempted to present
the two claims as factually distinct.159 According to the Court, the
wrongdoer of Nassar’s status-based discrimination claim was Levine,
and this claim required a showing of Levine’s race- and religionmotivated harassment and bias.160 The wrongdoer in Nassar’s
retaliation claim was Fitz, and this claim required Nassar to establish
Fitz’s retaliatory behavior.161 As such, according to the Court, these
claims were treated separately at trial and on appeal.162
However, it is unclear whether juries will really treat these
claims as separate at trial. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the jury
in Nassar’s case did treat his two claims as distinct. The fact that the
jury returned separate verdicts for each claim does not alone support
the Court’s conclusion that the jury considered the two claims
separately.163 Status-based discrimination claims and retaliation
claims in situations like Nassar’s—where the discriminatory
behavior of one University employee is closely intertwined with the
retaliatory behavior of another University employee—may not be as
distinct as the Court suggested.
As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, “trial judges . . . will
be obliged to charge discrete causation standards when a claim of
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See id. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2523–24 (majority opinion).
See id.
Id. at 2532.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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[status-based] discrimination . . . is coupled with a claim of
[retaliation]. And jurors will puzzle over the rhyme or reason for the
dual standards.”164
C. A Challenge to Congress
The Court in Nassar seemed more concerned with the increasing
number of retaliation claims filed with the EEOC than with actual
congressional intent, Supreme Court precedent, and reasoning based
on statutory text and structure.165 However, despite its problematic
and flawed reasoning, the Court has ruled and its decision is binding
on lower courts.
As it stands, the only remedy to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the causation standard of § 2000e-3(a) is
congressional action. In 1991, Congress responded to the Court’s
Price Waterhouse decision by passing amendments in the 1991 Act.
It is once again in Congress’s hands, in the aftermath of a Supreme
Court
interpretation
weakening
employees’
workplacediscrimination protections, to strengthen and restore remedies and
protections under Title VII.

164. Id. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 2531 (majority opinion); see also supra Part V (arguing that the Court’s
reasoning in Nassar is flawed ).

